Flying Blind in Greek-Turkish Relations

Flying Blind in Greek-Turkish Relations

The government finds itself facing deadends of its own making regarding Greek-Turkish relations, as it is now clear that the supposed rapprochement process has for months stumbled upon direct challenges to Greek sovereignty—challenges that are continually expanding due to the submissive stance adopted.

By
Konstantinos Tsakalos

The Turkey-Libya Axis: A Threat to National Interests

At the same time, Eastern Libya, following its rapprochement with Turkey, is “hazing” Greece and Europe by sending hundreds of migrants to Crete every day, causing suffocation on the island. Athens supposedly paved the way with Minister Gerapetritis’s visit to Benghazi, where he claimed to have found a “common understanding” on international law. The final result was a European fiasco: Haftar’s officials, who make up the alleged government, declared the EU Commission delegation and the Migration Ministers of Greece, Italy, and Malta persona non grata and expelled them from Benghazi. It appears that Eastern Libya has learned much from its new friend, Tayyip Erdogan, regarding the weaponization of migration, once again targeting Greece.

Government Strategy at a Deadlock

It is no coincidence that Mr. Gerapetritis left Benghazi satisfied just before the fiasco of the European ministers’ visit. Only days earlier, the appointed government in Benghazi had lashed out at Greece over the tender for offshore blocks south of Crete, essentially defending the Turkey-Libya memorandum. Furthermore, we did not hear a single word from Haftar’s side offering a reassuring message that his stance on the Turkey-Libya memorandum would change.

Regarding Greek-Turkish affairs, Tayyip Erdogan dashed any remaining expectations with his statements last week, answering a question about Greece’s concern over Turkey’s purchase of F-35s: “Greece’s concerns regarding the steps we take in the field of defense are baseless and meaningless. Turkey does not pose a threat to any country that does not threaten its security and interests and does not manifest a hostile stance toward it.” Simply put, Mr. Erdogan is warning that Turkey is a threat to countries moving against its interests—something he considers Greece to be doing.

The Failure of the “Athens Declaration”

Having misread Greek-Turkish relations, the government rushed to co-sign the Athens Declaration in December 2023. This was a significant success for Turkish diplomacy; with the vague promise of “calm waters,” Turkey secured Greece’s signature on a commitment that practically translated into abstaining from exercising sovereign rights without Turkey’s consent.

Warnings were numerous even then, which the government attempted to dismiss by highlighting the reduction in Turkish violations of Greek airspace. However, this reduction was largely due to other factors: the Turkish Air Force’s active involvement in operations in Northern Syria and Northern Iraq, cautiousness due to regional developments, and primarily the fact that there was almost no reason for violations, as Turkey has achieved a dramatic reduction in Greek military exercises in the Eastern Aegean, gradually turning the area into a “neutral zone.”

“Calm Waters” as a Smokescreen

Throughout this period, the supposed “calm waters” championed by the government were used by Turkey to “launder” its revisionism in the eyes of NATO allies and European partners. At every summit, the Greek government—appearing to perform a chore—merely mentioned the “Turkish threat” without maintaining a firm stance on what it means for a NATO member and EU candidate to occupy the territory of a European country and directly threaten the territory of another ally.

Thus, Athens lost a significant strategic advantage that required Turkey to take steps toward normalizing relations with Greece and Cyprus and abandoning its revisionist agenda for every step it took toward Europe. Today, it is clear that with the change in the White House, Turkey occupies a different, upgraded role, having largely shed its obligations toward Greece and Cyprus.

Concessions and “Appetite”

By following an adventurous policy, Tayyip Erdogan—balancing “with two feet in two boats”—took serious risks that currently seem to be paying off, strengthening Turkey’s regional role. Greece, by government choice, chose to make a series of concessions, believing that appeasement would “soften” Erdogan. Ultimately, these concessions only whetted Turkey’s appetite further.

The Turkish ban on surveys for the electrical interconnection (Great Sea Interconnector), the de facto imposition of the Turkey-Libya memorandum, the constant delays in designating marine parks—which were shrunken so as not to include islets Turkey considers “gray zones”—and the presentation of a Maritime Spatial Planning map that remains for “internal consumption” only, all compose the image of a country under tutelage.

The Cyprus Issue and the “Trap” of Dialogue

On the Cyprus issue, where the government and Minister Gerapetritis boast that the rapprochement supposedly helped restart talks, there is an attempt to deceive public opinion. Dialogue on the substance of the Cyprus issue has not begun. The meetings in New York are nothing more than a gradual slide toward discussing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between two entities, thereby equating the Republic of Cyprus with the pseudo-state. Without references to the UN Security Council resolutions for a bizonal, bicommunal federation, Turkey’s “red line” for a two-state solution begins to hover over these discussions.

The Shifting Sands of the Mediterranean

In the Eastern Mediterranean, the scene is worsening. While Egypt remains a steady interlocutor for Athens, it has restored relations with Turkey. It is evident that the two major Muslim nations will find a modus vivendi for power-sharing in the region as soon as the geopolitical environment allows. We must not forget that the partial delimitation of the EEZ between Greece and Egypt came at a high cost, with Greece accepting reduced influence (effect) for islands like Karpathos, Rhodes, and Crete.

This is the same problem Athens now faces with Libya. Despite the belated contact between Gerapetritis and General Haftar, Eastern Libya is playing an extortionist game, keeping the validation of the Turkey-Libya memorandum in suspense to avoid losing European funding, while remaining aligned with Turkish interests.

Turkey, through its “Blue Homeland” doctrine, has managed to dynamite Greece’s relations with Libya and undermine long-term relations with Egypt. Facing this deteriorating situation, the government simply watches and hopes for the best, insisting on an appeasement policy that has led to the current predicament.

TO PARON

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Photo: Meeting between Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and the President of the Republic of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Thursday, December 7, 2023. (TATIANA BOLARI / EUROKINISSI)